
Mistex now runs as a native Tor v3 hidden service. If you use Tor Browser you've probably already seen the prompt — the clearnet site advertises an
Onion-LocationThe address
hyktea5pdx57p3qgzg4fpvtydlre24jlmzh5oiv2gwh3pirtgfu7hryd.onion
Tor Browser takes you there; any onion-capable client (Brave in private-window Tor mode, etc.) does the same. Copy-paste for paranoid verification — an onion address is its own certificate.
What a hidden service gets you
Running over Tor replaces the usual HTTP stack with a network layer that deliberately hides the origin and the destination from the intermediate hops:
- No exit node. Hidden services skip the exit-node leg entirely. Your traffic never touches the clearnet on the server side. That eliminates the classic “malicious exit relay sniffs plaintext” risk.
- No DNS lookup. The onion address is resolved inside the Tor network against a distributed directory; your ISP's resolver never sees the query.
- No CA. The cryptographic identity of the server is the onion address itself — there's no browser CA-trust chain to compromise.
- End-to-end encryption by protocol. Tor circuits are encrypted between each hop. No separate HTTPS is needed (and no valid Let's Encrypt cert could be issued to a anyway without special arrangement).
.onion
What it does not get you
- Anonymity from us on the application level. If you log in to a cabinet account, we know that login exists. The Tor layer hides your IP; it doesn't make your session anonymous at the business-logic layer.
- Cookie/session overlap with clearnet. Cookies are per-origin. A session on mistex.io is not a session on the onion mirror. Log in separately on each — we consider this a feature, not a bug.
- Resistance to third-party scripts. If a page loads a script from a non-onion origin, that's a deanon channel. We audited our pages; the support chat is self-hosted (no foreign widget to load), fonts are self-hosted by Next.js at build time, and we'll keep any future third-party asset under the same rule.
How to use it well
- Use Tor Browser. It's pre-configured to not leak fingerprinting data. Other clients (including onion-capable non-Tor browsers) leak more than you'd expect.
- If you care about “safest” mode, keep JS off. The clearnet site currently requires JS for full interactivity — we're working on that, but a static no-JS flow is a separate project.
- Verify the address matches the one above the first time you use it. After that, Tor Browser caches it; bookmark it.
Under the hood
It's a Tor v3 onion service bound to our own nginx reverse proxy. The private key lives on the server and is backed up offline. Loss of the key means a new address — which is why we hold onto the key like it was a bearer instrument. Add the onion address to your wallet / docs / links if you publish these anywhere.
Why we did it
Three reasons.
- Privacy-serious users expect it. Major competitors have it; we should have it.
- It's a cheap, strong-signal commitment. An onion service requires almost no architectural change but materially reduces the surface between “user wants to swap” and “swap happens.”
- Some users operate in jurisdictions where reaching clearnet sites isn't reliable. The onion mirror routes around DNS blocks and IP-level filtering.
Takeaway
Onion-Location: http://hyktea5pdx57p3qgzg4fpvtydlre24jlmzh5oiv2gwh3pirtgfu7hryd.onion